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NOTES AND COMMENT
LOST INCOME-TAXATION. In Herzberg v. Wisconsin Tax Com-
mission,' the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was presented with the fol-
lowing situation. The deceased, Joseph Herzberg, had been an agent
for a life insurance company. By virtue of such agency he had become
entitled to certain commissions on the renewal premiums to be paid in
the future on the life policies which he, Herzberg, had written. At the
time of his death the present value of these future commissions was
fixed at $66,071, and an inheritance tax assessed on account thereof.
Later these commissions were paid by the insurance company to his
executor, and the question was whether such items constituted income
assessable to the estate. The then statute provided: "Every executor
or administrator shall be assessed on the .taxable income received by
him from the estate of the deceased during the year, together with the
income received by the decedent during that portion of the year covered
by the return preceding the demise of the deceased * * *2 The court
held that these items did not constitute income within the statute,
saying,
"The two sums so paid were but part payments of the obligations
to make future payments, the present worth of which obligation as of
the time of the death of the testator here having been appraised at
$66,071. They were in no sense interest upon the said fund of $66,071
or in any sense an increment to it, or in the nature of a return upon
the use of such fund * * * The oft repeated and now firmly established
doctrine that the term 'income' in such taxation statutes requires that
there must be the element of gain or profit as distinguished from corpus
or principal * * * is ample warrant and authority for the ruling we
now make."
The Court was probably right in not assessing these receipts. The
renewal commissions were not income to the decedent, who apparently
kept his books on a cash basis, because never received by him. They
were not income to the estate, because an integral part of the corpus
thereof, and not a gain or profit.3
As if to make certain the proper sohltion of the problem raised in
the Herzberg case, the income tax statute, while that case was still
pending, was amended so as to read:
"Every executor or administrator shall file an income tax return
S* * in all cases where the decedent if living would have been required
1 194 Wis. 126, 215 N.W. 936 (1927).
2 Wis. St. (1925) 71.09(5).
3 See discussion of this case, 4 Vi's. L.R. 465 (1928).
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to file such return. * * * Such executor or administrator shall include
in such return:
"1. All income received by the decedent during that portion of the
year covered by the return preceding the demise of the decedent.
"2. All receipts by him from the estate of the deceased during the
year covered by the return, if such receipts would have been taxable
as income to the decedent had he survived.
"3. All receipts by him during the year from the estate of the
deceased accrued at the date of the death of the decedent but not re-
ported by the decedent on the accrual basis, if such receipts would have
been taxable as income to the decedent had he survived and made the
return."4
This attempt to deal with the problem of the Herzberg case has
recently however been declared by the Supreme Court of the state, an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. In Norris v. Cary5 the
decedent had sold certain stock at a profit, payments to be made in
installments over a period of years. He died before the payments were
completed. In Smart v. Wisconsin Tax Commission 6 a lawyer died
leaving owing to his estate certain fees for services rendered. In both
cases the assessor of incomes for Milwaukee County assessed the
respective executors of the estates of the decedents for the receipt by
them of the above mentioned items. Reliance was had on the income
tax statute as above amended. The order of the Tax Commission
affirming the assessment was reversed by the Circuit Court and the
Circuit Court's judgment affirmed in the Supreme Court. Although in
both caseg the decedent had died prior to the amendment of the statute,
the court in holding the statute unconstitutional seems not to have re-
lied on this feature alone, but upon the ground that the legislation
was inherently invalid as an attempt to tax as income a receipt of
money, which was not income but corpus. The Court said:
"Items of the character considered in this case uncollected at the
time of death fix themselves into the estate, become part of the corpus,
are subject to inheritance tax, but can not be treated as income * * *
Therefore an act which attempts to impose an income tax on what is,
and is commonly understood to be principal, capital, or corpus of an
estate, is void."
7
4 Wis. St. (1931) 71.095(1) (a). Italics are author's.
r237 N.W. 113, 238 N.W. 415 (Wis. 1931).
6237 N.W. 114 (\Vis. 1931).
7Norris v. Cary, supra. 238 N.W. 415. See also In re West, 242 N.W. 165
(1932) at page 169.
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Now in all these three cases it is obvious that the items considered
by themselves are intrinsically income. They are either payments for
personal services rendered, or else the profit made on the conversion
of capital assets. Had the creditors in the three cases not died but
survivd to collect these items they would clearly have constituted in-
come and have been taxable as such. How can the death of the prospec-
tive recipient and the subsequent collection by his personal representa-
tive of the items change their character as income? It is believed that
the correct answer is that they can not. It is admitted that at first im-
pression there seems to be gross inconsistency in treating at one time
the right to receive these sums as an inheritance and taxing it as such,
and at a later time treating the actual receipt of the same money as
income and so taxing it. Yet closer consideration of the problem will
show that this is not so. The two taxes, the inheritance and the income,
are both excise taxes, or in the nature thereof. The inheritance tax is
laid on the exercise of the right to pass property from the dead to the
living, and is measured by the value of the right transferred. The in-
come tax is levied on the right to receive income, and is measured by
the amount received. Now if the right which the decedent, either by
will or the laws or intestate succession, passes to the living is the right
to receive income, there will in the nature of thinge be two taxes
leviable; the inheritance tax on the passage of the right, and the income
tax on the receipt of the income. The circumstance that the value of
the inheritance, allowance being made for the future receipt of the
sums devised, will be the same as the amount of the income received
does not alter the fact that the two taxes are levied on two distinct
rights. This has been decided both by the Supreme Court of the United
States and by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in cases involving the
bequest of the income from a capital sum, and holding that the subse-
quent receipt of such income was taxable under the income tax laws.8
In the present type of cases, however, it may be argued that the
subsequent receipt of the items involved is not income to the estate,
but a part of the corpus. Against this stands the query previously made,
can the receipt of the sums in question by the decedent's personal repre-
sentative be corpus, if the receipt of those sums by the decedent him-
self would have been income? The explanation is believed to be in the
fact that a shift is made in the methods of accounting by which the
inheritance and the income tax in these particular cases has been deter-
mined. Had the original tax payer, the decedent, kept his books on
an accrual basis, it is clear that an income tax would have been prop-
s Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 45 Sup. Ct. 475, (1925) ;
State ex rel Hickox v. Widule, 166 Wis. 113, 163 N.W. 648 (1917);
For a discussion of the latter case see 4 Wis. L.R. 368 (1928).
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erly assessable against him personally and certainly his personal repre-
sentative could have been compelled to return for taxation items of in-
come properly chargeable to the decedent prior to his death. He, how-
ever, kept his books on a cash basis and so no income tax was charge-
able against him. But when the inheritance tax was figured this right
to receive income was quite properly, treated as an existing valuable
right of the estate, and taken into consideration in valuing it. This is
a shift to the accrual basis. Just as in income taxation on that basis, the
right to receive income in the future, is treated as the equivalent of
income already in hand, so here for inheritance tax purposes the right
to receive these sums is treated as if they were already received and
were a part of the estate. The subsequent actual receipt of the income
does not, therefore, enhance the estate, but this does not deprive the
receipt of the money of its intrinsic character of income. What the
decedent, whether by will or intestate law has done is to pass on to his
personal representative the right to receive income. That such right
should be burdened with the duty of paying the income tax due there-
on seems indubitable. The laws of both the United States and Wiscon-
sin provide that when a donee of property sells the same that the basis
on which the profit from the sale of such property shall be determined
shall be, not the value at the time he acquired it, but the cost of the
property to his donor. This apparent assessment to one person of a
profit which had accrued to another is justified on the theory that the
original owner of the property holds it "subject to the right of the
sovereign to take part of any increase in its value when separated
through sale or conversion and reduced to his possession, and that his
donee takes it subject to that burden." This line of reasoning is cer-
tainly doubly applicable to the personal representative of a decedent
who has acquired from the latter the right to collect items of income.
It is believed that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
Norris- and Smart cases deprives the state of income taxes to which
it is on every count justly entitled.
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